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I. STATEMENT OF CASE1 
 
This case arises from the defendant’s, Mike Von Jones (“Jones”), failure to pay Safaris 
Unlimited, LLC (“Safaris Unlimited”) for an African hunting safari that occurred in late 2012 
(the “2012 Hunt”). Jones’s principal defense in this case has been that Safaris Unlimited is not a 
real party in interest and that any amount owed by Jones for the 2012 Hunt was owed to HHK 
Safaris (Pvt) Ltd (“HHK”). HHK is a Zimbabwe-based corporation that contracts with Safaris 
Unlimited to provide safari hunting services to Safaris Unlimited’s clients. Tr Vol. I, p. 115, L. 
5–14; p. 123, L. 22–25; p. 124, L. 5; p. 162, L. 23–25. 
Following this Court’s remand of this case pursuant to its decision in Idaho Supreme 
Court Case Docket No. 42614, 2015 Opinion No. 70, Safaris Unlimited amended its Complaint 
to allege alternative theories of relief relative to its breach of contract claim, including the 
existence of a contract between Jones and Safaris Unlimited directly; between Jones and HHK, 
under which Safaris Unlimited is a third-party beneficiary; and between Jones and HHK, where 
HHK assigned its rights to receive payment to Safaris Unlimited.  
THE TRIAL 
 At trial, Safaris Unlimited called three witnesses with regard to its case in chief: Graham 
Hingeston, Derek Adams, and Jennifer Ryan. Mr. Hingeston is an owner and the managing 
director of HHK. Id. at p. 115, L. 5–14. Mr. Hingeston testified that, pursuant to an “exclusive 
                                                 
1 Because this case has been before this Court previously on appeal, Safaris Unlimited will focus on the evidence 
presented to the jury at trial that relates to the issues on appeal and the events occurring after Judgment had been 
entered. Further, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(7), Safaris Unlimited will not set forth a complete 
statement of the facts elicited through testimony or documentary evidence at trial, as much of the evidence has been 
adequately addressed by Jones in his Opening Brief. 
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contractual arrangement,” HHK provides safari services for Safaris Unlimited’s clients. Id. at p. 
123, L. 22–25. Under that arrangement, Safaris Unlimited pays HHK for the services rendered to 
Safaris Unlimited’s clients by HHK and then invoices and collects the cost of the safari from the 
clients directly. Id. at p. 124, L. 5; p. 162, L. 23–25.  
  Unlike prior years, Jones scheduled the 2012 Hunt with Mr. Hingeston directly. Ms. 
Ryan, the general manager of Safaris Unlimited, testified that Mr. Hingeston is authorized to 
schedule hunts on behalf of Safaris Unlimited. Id. at p. 308, L. 22–24. Mr. Hingeston testified 
that it was not uncommon for him to communicate directly with clients prior to a hunt in order to 
discuss and agree upon details concerning the hunt so that “there can be no confusion then.” Id. 
at p. 124, L. 15 through p. 125, L. 12. Ms. Ryan also testified that returning clients frequently 
contact Mr. Hingeston or the professional hunter directly to schedule subsequent hunts. Id. at p. 
267, L. 23 through p. 268, L. 10. Notably, with regard to the 2012 Hunt, Mr. Hingeston testified 
that he understood that the contract was between Safaris Unlimited and Jones and that Jones was 
to pay Safaris Unlimited for the 2012 Hunt. Id. at p. 197, L. 13–19.  
 Prior to the hunt, Ms. Ryan prepared an invoice form from Safaris Unlimited, which was 
included in Jones’s client file and taken on the hunt by the professional hunter. Tr Vol. I, p. 181, 
L. 8–16; p. 212, L. 3–12; p. 286, L. 5 through p. 287, L. 1. Among other documents, Jones’s 
client file also included a “TR2” form required by the Zimbabwe government. Mr. Adams, the 
professional hunter on the 2012 Hunt, testified that he sat down with Jones at the conclusion of 
the hunt, completed the invoice form from Safaris Unlimited and the TR2 with the information 
about the animals taken by Jones during the Hunt, and reviewed the information in those 
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documents with Jones. Id. at p. 221, L. 16 through p. 223, L. 13. Mr. Adams further testified that 
he witnessed Jones sign both the invoice from Safaris Unlimited and the TR2, which were 
admitted as Exhibits 34 and 35, respectfully. Id. at p. 213, L. 17 through p. 214, L. 2; p. 221, L. 
16 through p. 223, L. 13; Exhibits 34 and 35.  
 During his direct examination, Jones denied signing either Exhibit 34 or Exhibit 35. Tr 
Vol. I, p. 349–50. On cross examination, Safaris Unlimited questioned Jones concerning other 
documents that had been filed with the trial court in connection with this case, specifically those 
documents admitted as Exhibits 38 and 39. Exhibit 39 was signed “Mike Von Jones.” Exhibit 39. 
Jones had testified that he “[n]ever [goes by] Von Jones, that’s ridiculous.” Tr Vol. I, p. 350, L. 
3–5. When Jones was questioned concerning his signature on Exhibit 39, he refused to provide a 
direct answer and would acknowledge only that the signature did not look like his signature.  
Q Did you sign [Exhibit 39]? 
A I can’t tell you. Doesn’t look like my signature at all. I’m thinking, and this is 
my only thought, at that point in time this was after I’d had quite a bit of severe 
back and shoulder injury, and I think this accident happened in ‘12, ‘13, ‘14, 
somewhere in there. I don’t know. 
Q Okay. 
A I’m still suffering from it. I don’t know. Doesn’t look like my signature, but I 
don’t recognize the document.  
* * * 
A I don’t know. I can’t recognize that as my signature. 
* * * 
Q And your testimony is that that is not your signature? 
A It doesn’t look like it, but at the time I had a severe arm and shoulder injury, 
and I couldn’t write like I normally do. 
Q I understand. Let me ask you a different way. Is that your signature on line 39? 
A Doesn’t look like my signature, no. 
Q Just a yes or no. 
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A Doesn’t look like my signature. I’m going to say that, no, that did not look like 
my signature. I won’t say that it’s not, because if it’s notarized, it probably is, but 
certainly is a mess. 
* * * 
Q Are you saying this is probably your signature because it’s notarized? 
A It very well could be, but that’s not my signature, I mean that’s not the way I 
write, and as I said, I had a severe injury. I, like, laid up for over two years, in 
fact, I am still laid up from it, and I couldn’t write, so maybe that’s what the 
writing in 2014. I don’t have copies of that in front of me to verify. 
 
Id. at p. 441, L. 24 through p. 444, L. 19. 
 
Later, outside of the presence of the jury, the trial court noted that Jones had filed Exhibit 
39, along with the attending discovery responses, with the court in support of his objection to 
Safaris Unlimited’s motion for summary judgment a few years prior. Id. at p. 459, L. 23 through 
p. 460, L. 14. Exhibit 39. Specifically, the trial court stated,  
If [Jones] is denying that that is his signature [on Exhibit 39], he is estopped from 
doing that because, in my view, if that is not the truth, that is a fraud on this 
Court, and I will not tolerate it. For that reason, and I’m not making that finding, 
I’m just saying you don’t get it both ways. I find that’s sufficient foundation 
because it was represented to the court system that those were signed 
interrogatories, so he can deny all he wants, but that’s not going to keep this 
document out.  
 
Id. at p. 460, L. 6–14. 
 In addition to Exhibits 38 and 39, Safaris Unlimited sought to question Jones concerning 
a Reissuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Notice of Hearing, which had been filed in an 
unrelated case nine (9) days prior to date of Jones’s testimony. Exhibit 40a.  
Outside of the presence of the jury, Jones’s counsel objected to the admission of Exhibit 
40a on the grounds that it was not timely disclosed and contained irrelevant and prejudicial 
information. Tr p. 444, L. 21 through p. 446, L. 24. Assuming that the proper foundation would 
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be laid, the trial court held that the all information from the document would be redacted, save 
the signature and date only. Id. at p. 452, L. 12 through p. 453, L. 13. At Jones’s counsel’s 
request, the trial court directed Safaris Unlimited to lay appropriate foundation outside of the 
presence of the jury. Id. at L. 15–21. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, we’re going to give you Exhibit 40,[2] and Mr. Gadd 
will ask you some questions about that. 
BY MR. GADD: 
Q Mr. Jones, do you recognize that document? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Is that your signature on the respondent line? 
A I scratched on it. 
Q Is that a yes? 
A Yes. 
MR. GADD: Your Honor, I’d move to admit a redacted version Exhibit 40. 
THE COURT: Mr. Larsen, I think that’s sufficient foundation. 
MR. LARSEN: Yes. I agree. 
Tr, Vol. I, p. 453, L. 25 through p. 454, L. 14 (emphasis added). The document then-marked as 
Exhibit 40 was taken and redacted pursuant to the trial court’s instruction, leaving only Jones’s 
signature and date. The redacted document was marked as Exhibit 40, and the unredacted 
document was re-marked as Exhibit 40a.  
Jones was present in the courtroom on the witness stand during the entirety of the 
discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning Exhibits 40 and 40a. Id. at p. 444–64. 
He was present when the trial court directed Exhibit 40a be redacted. Id. He was present when 
his attorney objected on the grounds that, as a result of the redaction, he could not inquire of 
Jones concerning his state of mind at the time of his signature, including whether he was 
                                                 
2 At this point in the trial, the unredacted document, Exhibit 40a, had been marked as Exhibit 40.  
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“anxious,” “upset,” or “shaking.” Id. at p. 461, L. 1–3. He was also present when the trial court 
provided its admonishment with regard to Exhibit 39 and perpetrating a fraud on the court. Id. at 
p. 460. 
However, when Jones was presented with Exhibit 40 after the jury had returned and was 
asked questions nearly identical to the question that he had answered outside of the presence of 
the jury moments earlier, Jones attempted to evade and equivocate, just as he had with respect to 
Exhibit 39.   
Q Mr. Jones, do you recognize the signature on Exhibit 40? 
A It doesn’t look like my signature, but if it’s -- I don’t -- and again, I’m not 
positive what document it’s associated with. So it makes it very difficult for me to 
ascertain the validity of it. If it’s the document that I think that it is, I was in a 
very precarious position, if I did, indeed, sign this, I signed it. 
Q I just need a yes or no. 
A With my hand like this, and I was in a very shaky situation, the circumstances 
were very shaky. It was not a normal circumstance like I was coming into your 
office and sitting down. Very extenuating circumstances involved if it’s what I 
think it is. But I don’t know what it is. 
Q Mr. Jones, is that your signature on Exhibit 40? 
A It didn’t look like my signature but could be. 
Q Mr. Jones, I just need a yes or no. Is that your signature? 
A I don’t know what the document is. 
 
Id. at p. 462, L. 1–22. 
At this point, the trial court interceded. “Mr. Jones, the question is very simple. Is that or 
is that not your signature, yes or no?” Id. at p. 462, L. 23–25. Again, Jones refused to answer the 
question directly. 
THE WITNESS: It -- 
THE COURT: No, I don’t want an explanation. I want a yes-or-no answer to that 
question. 
THE WITNESS: It’s not the way I sign it, but it might be. 
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THE COURT: That is not the question, sir. I want to give you one more 
opportunity to answer the Court’s direct question. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I’m getting tired of this -- 
THE WITNESS: I suspect -- 
THE COURT: Be quiet. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Is that or is that not your signature? Yes or no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
 
Id. at p. 463, L. 1–19. The trial court admitted Exhibit 40 over Jones’s objection and explained to 
the jury that irrelevant information on the document had been redacted. Id. at p. 464. Jones did 
not object to the trial court’s questioning of Jones at any point during the trial.  
 Following the presentation of the evidence, the trial court and counsel met outside of the 
presence of the jury to review and discuss post-proof jury instructions. Tr Vol. I, p. 477–527. 
Notably, with respect to Instruction No. 13, Jones did not object to the proposed instruction, but 
rather advocated for its inclusion. Id. at p. 500, L. 2 through p. 509, L. 15. Jones’s counsel’s 
comments concerning Instruction No. 13 included, “We need the agency instruction,” the trial 
court should “keep it,” and it includes “a correct recitation of the law.”  Id. at p. 503, L. 6; p. 504, 
L. 16; p. 509, L. 13.  
 After a brief deliberation, the jury unanimously found that Jones had an express or 
implied contract with Safaris Unlimited directly and that he breached that contract. R, Vol I. p. 
77–88. The jury also unanimously awarded damages in the amount of $26,040.00, the entire 
amount prayed for by Safaris Unlimited in its complaint. Id. at p. 23–29; 77–88. The trial court 
entered Judgment pursuant to the verdict, from which Jones has appealed.  
RESPONDENT / CROSS-APPELLANT’S REVISED BRIEF | Page 8 
AFTER THE TRIAL 
Following entry of the Amended Judgment against Jones, which awarded Safaris 
Unlimited its attorney’s fees and costs, Safaris Unlimited sought and, on June 2, 2017, obtained a 
Writ of Execution. R Vol. II, pp. 25–29. The Writ directed the Twin Falls County sheriff to 
satisfy the Amended Judgment 
out of the personal and real property of Mike Von Jones, including, without 
limitation, 
 
all right, title, claim, and interest of Defendant Mike Von Jones in and to 
all claims, demands, damages, debts, liabilities, accounts, reckonings, 
obligations, bonds, guarantees, warranties, costs, expenses, losses, liens, 
actions, and causes of action of each and every kind, nature and 
description, whether now known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, 
which Jones might have, own, or hold, or at any time heretofore ever had, 
owned, or held against Jeremy Sligar and/or Overtime Garage, LLC, 
including, without limitation, those claims that are the subject of the 
lawsuit of Mike Jones v. Jeremy Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC; Twin 
Falls County Case No. CV42-16-1554, and any and all proceeds thereon 
[“the Sligar Lawsuit”],  
 
and make return of this Writ within twenty (20) days after receipt hereof, entering 
that which you have done thereon. 
 
Id at p. 28. Although Jones alleges multiple counts against the defendants in the Sligar Lawsuit, 
and the defendants allege multiple counterclaims against Jones, that case, at its heart, involves 
the dissolution and accounting of an alleged partnership or other business relationship between 
the parties thereto. Id. at pp. 39–64; Tr Vol. II, p. 38, L. 18–24.  
 On June 7, 2017, the Twin Falls County sheriff served a copy of the Writ, along with a 
Notice of Levy, Notice of Sheriff Sale, and Claim of Exemption forms personally on Brooke 
Redmond, counsel for Jones in the Sligar Lawsuit. Id. at pp. 36, 76. Copies of the 
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aforementioned documents were also mailed to Ms. Redmond and Jones on that same date. Id. 
At no point did Jones file a claim of exemption with regard to his rights in the Sligar Lawsuit. Tr 
Vol. II, p. 18, L. 23–25. 
 In accordance with Idaho Code § 11-302, on June 22, 2017, the Twin Falls County sheriff 
posted Notices of Sheriff’s Sale in three (3) public places in the City of Twin Falls, specifically 
the Twin Falls County Courthouse, Twin Falls City Hall, and Twin Falls Public Library. Id.  
 On June 23, 2017, Jones filed with the trial court a Motion to Vacate Sheriff’s Sale, an Ex 
Parte Motion to Vacate Sheriff’s Sale Pending Hearing, an Affidavit of Brooke Baldwin 
Redmond in Support of Motion to Vacate Sheriff’s Sale, and a Motion to Shorten Time. R Vol. II, 
pp. 30–66. Safaris Unlimited objected to Jones’s motions and subsequently filed a memorandum 
in support of its objection. Id. at 67–75. Ultimately, Jones was unable to have his motions heard 
prior to the scheduled date of the sheriff’s sale, evidently due to the trial judge being out of the 
office at the time. Tr Vol. II, p. 3, L. 13–18.  
 On June 28, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., as noticed, the Twin Falls County sheriff sold Jones’s 
rights in and interest to the Sligar Lawsuit at the Twin Falls County sheriff’s office. R Vol. II, pp. 
76–77. Counsel for Safaris Unlimited was the only bidder present at the sale and credit bid the 
amount of $2,500. Id.; Tr Vol. II, p. 19, L. 12–17. The Twin Falls County sheriff filed a Sheriff’s 
Return of Service on June 30, 2017. R Vol. II, pp. 76–77. Later that day, Jones noticed his 
Motion to Vacate Sheriff’s Sale for hearing on July 17, 2017. 
 At that hearing, the trial court asked the following of Jones’s counsel during argument:  
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THE COURT: How do I determine what the fair market value is? Again, let’s 
assume I set aside this sale, Mr. Gadd notices up this action again. Does he have 
to bid more than his judgment in order to satisfy the requirement of an inadequate 
sheriff sale?  
 
MR. LARSEN: Your Honor, I think your question really answers itself. If you 
can’t determine the fair market value of this asset, then should it be attached at 
all? Should it be levied upon at all? 
 
Tr Vol. II, p. 10, L. 19–p. 11, L. 2.  
 
 Following argument, the trial court noted that the Sligar Lawsuit was disputed, stating 
that “[i]t may be that Mr. Sliger owes Mr. Jones some money, it may be that Mr. Jones owes Mr. 
Sliger some money, it may be that neither one of them owes anybody money. Who knows?” Id. 
at p. 38, L. 25–p. 39, L. 3. “The motion that is before the Court is to set [the sheriff’s sale] aside 
because of the inadequacy of the bid by Safaris. I don’t think -- I don’t find that there’s any other 
irregularity shown here.” Id. at L. 10–13. The trial court further held that a creditor can levy on 
“virtually anything, anything in the State of Idaho to collect a judgment,” subject only to a 
debtor’s claim of exemption. Id. at L. 17–22. Specifically, the trial court held that “there’s 
nothing wrong with having levied upon this litigation.” Id. at p. 40, L. 1–2.  
 The trial court then pivoted, however, stating that “the sale has got to represent some 
reasonable relation between the value of the bid and the value of the property.” Id. at L. 11–15. 
Despite being unable to determine itself the value of the Sligar Lawsuit, the court vacated the 
sheriff’s sale and granted Safaris Unlimited what is effectively a lien against the Sligar Lawsuit. 
Id. at pp. 41, 44. The trial court referred to its decision as a “reasonable compromise to avoid the 
issue of letting a creditor control unliquidated claims.” Id. at p. 42, L. 5–7. “Your judgment’s 
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going to bear interest,” the court told counsel for Safaris Unlimited. “That’s all you’re entitled to 
under the statutes.” Id. at L. 5–7. 
 The trial court initially failed to identify any “additional circumstances” upon which its 
decision was based. When pressed for further explanation in this respect, the trial court stated, “I 
don’t think there is anything that you did that was improper about noticing this matter up for 
sale. I think the notice was given.” Id. at p. 43, L. 13–16. Eventually, the court held that the 
“additional circumstance” was “just the whole nature of this case.” Id. at L. 19–22.  
 Upon being asked to clarify its findings as to the additional circumstances, the trial court 
explained,  
Well, the additional circumstances is the nature of this case, that it is an 
unliquidated litigation, and though I’m finding that you can levy upon and sell 
that, that creates a whole issue here of what’s the right amount to bid? Do you bid 
10,000, 50,000, 125,000? I mean, it’s the nature of – the argument that the 
defendant is making here is that that’s the whole problem with unlitigated claims 
is you don’t know what they’re really worth, like real estate. And I think that is 
the set of additional circumstances that differentiates this case from, perhaps, 
others. 
 
Id. at p. 44, L. 6–16 (emphasis added). The trial court again reiterated that the “additional 
circumstance” were that the property sold was an unliquidated cause of action. Id. at p. 45, L. 3–
6.  
 The trial court subsequently entered an Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s 
Sale. Safaris Unlimited timely appealed that Order.  
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it granted Jones’s motion and ordered 
that the sheriff’s execution sale be set aside. 
 
B. Whether Safaris Unlimited is entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-
120(1).  
 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Jones contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting Exhibit 40 
over his objection, by questioning Jones in a manner that Jones asserts casted doubt on his 
credibility, and by instructing the jury on the law as it pertains to principals and agents.  
“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the 
ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court’s discretion and a substantial right of the party is 
affected.” Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995). 
Concerning Jones’s assignment of error to the trial court’s questioning of him, “A trial judge is 
vested with broad discretionary powers in the conduct and during progress of a trial. His exercise 
of that discretion will not be disturbed unless abused or material harm be done to the 
complaining party.” Cardoza v. Cardoza, 76 Idaho 347, 350, 282 P.2d 475, 476 (1955).  
“[T]he burden is on the person asserting error to show an abuse of discretion.” Merrill v. 
Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 843, 87 P.3d 949, 952 (2004). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion 
if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and 
applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of 
reason.” O’Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). “A 
party alleging error on appeal must also show that the alleged errors were prejudicial.” Saint 
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Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Assocs., LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 334 P.3d 780 (2014). 
“[A]lleged errors not affecting substantial rights will be disregarded.” Weinstein v. Prudential 
Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 310, 233 P.3d 1221, 1232 (2010).  
“The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
free review, and the standard of review of whether a jury instruction should or should not have 
been given is whether there is evidence at trial to support the instruction, and whether the 
instruction is a correct statement of the law.” Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 
388, 257 P.3d 755 (2011) (citing Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 156, 45 P.3d 810, 812 (2002)). 
The appellate court reviews jury instructions as a whole “to determine whether the instructions 
fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law.” Id. “Even where an instruction is 
erroneous, the error is not reversible unless the jury instructions taken as a whole mislead or 
prejudice a party.” Id.  
With reference to Safaris Unlimited’s cross-appeal, this Court has held, “Whether to set 
aside an execution sale lies largely within the trial court’s discretion.” Suchan v. Suchan, 113 
Idaho 102, 109, 741 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1986). “Each case depends largely on its own peculiar 
facts; and whether the circumstances, coupled with inadequacy of price, are sufficient to warrant 
setting aside the sale is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court.” Gaskill v. 
Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 433, 293 P.2d 957, 960 (1956).  
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IV. ARGUMENT 
 
A. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EXHIBIT 40 INTO EVIDENCE. 
 
Jones’s contention that the trial court erred in admitting Exhibit 40 is without merit 
because Exhibit 40 was both relevant and had been authenticated by Jones’s testimony. “All 
relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by other rules 
applicable in the courts of this state.” Idaho R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Id. at 401.  
In addition to being relevant, documentary evidence must also be authenticated. Idaho R. 
Evid. 901. “Authentication or identification of documentary evidence is a condition precedent to 
its admissibility.” Harris, Inc., v. Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 
P.3d 400, 409 (2011). “Pursuant to I.R.E. 901(a), authentication or identification ‘is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.’” 
Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 546, 328 P.3d 520, 526 (2014). Testimony of a witness with 
knowledge concerning a matter is sufficient to satisfy the authentication requirement for 
documentary evidence. Idaho R. Evid. 901(b)(1). 
At trial, Mr. Adams testified that Jones signed Exhibits 34 and 35 before leaving the 
camp. Tr Vol I., p. 213, L. 17–18; p. 222, L. 10–12. These exhibits provided evidence of the 
amount owed by Jones for the safari services, his obligation to pay Safaris Unlimited rather than 
another entity, and of his acknowledgement of that obligation. When Jones testified, he denied 
signing Exhibits 34 and 35. Id. at p. 349, L. 14 through p. 350, L. 20. Furthermore, Jones then 
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compared the signature on Exhibit 2, a cashier’s check, to the signatures on Exhibits 34 and 35, 
testifying that the signatures on the latter exhibits bore no resemblance to the signature on 
Exhibit 2. Id. at p. 350, L. 21 through p. 351, L. 18. By denying that he signed Exhibits 34 and 
35 and then comparing the appearance of the signatures on those documents to the signature on 
Exhibit 2, Jones placed the appearance of his signature at issue. Consequently, other examples of 
Jones’s signature, such as the one on Exhibit 40, became relevant.  
Jones later testified that the signature on Exhibit 40 was his signature. Thus, Exhibit 40 
was properly authenticated by Jones himself. Because Exhibit 40 was both relevant and 
authenticated, it satisfied the requirements for admission into evidence and was properly 
admitted by the trial court.    
 In his Opening Brief, Jones does not argue that Exhibit 40 was not relevant or had not 
been authenticated. Rather, Jones relies upon federal case law for the proposition that juries 
should not be allowed to make handwriting comparisons when there are “extreme or unusual 
circumstances.” Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 10. Jones’s reliance on federal case law is 
misplaced. As explained by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, “‘Extreme or unusual 
circumstances’ involve situations where the authenticity of the handwriting is the primary issue 
in the case, as where forgery is alleged.” United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1395 (9th Cir. 
1986) (emphasis added). There was no allegation of forgery in this case. Therefore, there were 
no “extreme or unusual circumstances” that would preclude the jury from comparing the Jones’s 
signatures with those on Exhibits 34 and 35. Indeed, as stated by the Jenkins court, “[T]he jury is 
obliged to make such comparisons and draw conclusions from them.” Id.  
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Idaho law expressly contemplates the trier of fact comparing documents with an 
exemplar. Idaho R. Evid. 901(b)(3) (stating that a document may be authenticated by 
“[c]omparison by the trier of fact . . . with specimens which have been authenticated”). In fact, 
this Court has previously allowed the jury to compare handwriting samples, even in cases 
involving allegations of forgery. See e.g., State v. Bentley, 54 Idaho 780, 36 P.2d 532 (1934); 
State v. Allen, 53 Idaho 737, 27 P.2d 482 (1933); State v. Carlson, 53 Idaho 139, 22 P.2d 143 
(1933).  
Furthermore, Jones himself opened the door to the line of questioning concerning the 
appearance of his signatures by asking the jury to compare the signatures on Exhibits 34 and 35 
with the signature on Exhibit 2. He cannot now argue that the jury should not have been allowed 
to compare his signature on Exhibit 40 with the signatures on Exhibits 34 and 35. Jones’s 
contention that the trial court should not have admitted Exhibit 40 in light of the “extreme or 
unusual circumstances” present in this case is wholly without merit. 
Jones’s argument that Safaris Unlimited’s failure to disclose Exhibit 40 in accordance 
with the trial court’s deadlines and that the case from which Exhibit 40 originated should have 
been sealed are also meritless. As noted by the trial court, Exhibit 40 was created a mere nine 
days prior to trial, so the trial court did not deem it a “discovery issue.” Tr Vol. I, p. 451, L. 14–
20. Indeed, it would have been impossible for Safaris Unlimited to disclose Exhibit 40 in 
accordance with the trial court’s exhibit disclosure deadline. Furthermore, Exhibit 40 was used 
for the purpose of impeachment, and parties are generally not required to disclose impeachment 
exhibits. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 16(d).  
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Jones also argues that Exhibit 40 should not have been admitted because he did not have 
the ability to testify effectively concerning the circumstances in which he signed it without 
discussing the irrelevant and potentially prejudicial facts involving another lawsuit. While, as 
Jones noted, “effective rebuttal lessens the danger that jurors will assign improper weight to their 
comparisons of handwriting samples,” that principal goes to the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility. United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1983). In fact, the Clifford court 
expressly stated that “evidentiary arguments . . . are properly addressed to the weight and not to 
the admissibility of the . . . correspondence.” Id. (emphasis added). Jones has failed to 
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibit 40.  
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY INSTRUCTING JONES TO ANSWER 
COUNSEL’S QUESTION REGARDING EXHIBIT 40. 
 
Jones argues that the trial court violated his procedural due process rights and committed 
reversible error by questioning Jones in a manner that evidenced the court’s “anger and 
frustration” with him. Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 15. This argument is without merit for at least 
two reasons. First, Jones failed to preserve the issue for appeal by neglecting to object to the trial 
court’s comments during trial. Second, Jones has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s 
comments were an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. Each of these reasons will be 
addressed in turn.  
1. By Failing to Object to the Trial Court’s Comments During Trial, Jones Has Waived the 
Issue on Appeal. 
 
To preserve this argument, Jones was required to object to the prejudicial nature of the 
trial court’s questioning during the trial.  
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This Court has specifically held that where a party fails to object to allegedly 
prejudicial comments made by the trial judge, that issue is normally waived on 
appeal. Where no objection was made, the Court will only review for fundamental 
errors—errors that “go[] to the foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights.” 
However, the fundamental error analysis does not apply in civil cases.  
 
Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 711, 378 P.3d 464, 501 (2016) (internal citations omitted); First 
Realty & Inv. Co. v. Rubert, 100 Idaho 493, 497, 600 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1979). “Objections to the 
interrogation of a witness by the court may be made at the time of interrogation or at the next 
available opportunity when the jury is not present.” Idaho R. Evid. 614(c).  
 The record reveals that Jones failed to object to the trial court’s questioning at any time 
during the course of the trial, including at the time of the subject interrogation and at the next 
available opportunity when the jury was not present. Having failed to object, Jones has waived 
the right to argue the issue on appeal.  
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Requiring Jones to Answer Directly the 
Question Posed by Counsel.  
 
Assuming, arguendo, that Jones properly preserved this issue for appeal, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it required Jones to answer directly the question posed to him 
by counsel. “[A]mong the inherent powers of the judicial branch is the authority vested in the 
courts to protect and maintain the dignity and integrity of the court room and to achieve the 
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Talbot v. Ames Const., 127 Idaho 648, 652, 904 
P.2d 560, 564 (1995). “A trial judge is vested with broad discretionary powers in the conduct and 
during progress of a trial. His exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless abused or 
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material harm be done to the complaining party.” Cardoza v. Cardoza, 76 Idaho 347, 350, 282 
P.2d 475, 476 (1955). 
Requiring a witness to answer directly a question posed to him by counsel is well within 
the trial court’s discretion, particularly when a witness is attempting to evade the question. For 
example, in State v. Glanzman, 69 Idaho 46, 202 P.2d 407 (1949), this Court found that there 
was no prejudice to a defendant when the trial court spoke “sharply” and threatened him with 
contempt in front of the jury because of the defendant’s refusal to answer the questions posed to 
him. In so finding, this Court stated,  
The text of the remarks by the court (criticised [sic] by appellant) clearly show he 
was merely attempting to get appellant, when on the witness stand, to answer the 
questions without circumlocution and while it is better for the trial court not to 
threaten the defendant with disciplinary proceedings in the presence of the jury, 
the attitude of appellant, apparent to the learned trial judge and perforce not to us, 
may have indicated it was necessary to speak sharply to secure the attention of 
witness to the questions and responses thereto.  
 
Id. at 52, 202 P.2d at 410 (emphasis added).  
 
 In his Brief, Jones quoted the exchange between himself and the trial court. Those 
quotations, however, by themselves, do not accurately reflect what occurred during the trial. A 
more thorough review of the transcript reveals that, much like the court in Glanzman, the trial 
court below was attempting to get Jones to answer those questions posed to him without 
providing unsolicited explanation or equivocation.  
Prior to the subject exchange, Jones frankly answered questions concerning his signature 
on Exhibit 40 when outside of the presence of the jury. Id. at L. 15–21. 
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THE COURT: Mr. Jones, we’re going to give you Exhibit 40,[3] and Mr. Gadd 
will ask you some questions about that. 
BY MR. GADD: 
Q Mr. Jones, do you recognize that document? 
A Oh, yes. 
Q Is that your signature on the respondent line? 
A I scratched on it. 
Q Is that a yes? 
A Yes. 
MR. GADD: Your Honor, I’d move to admit a redacted version Exhibit 40. 
THE COURT: Mr. Larsen, I think that’s sufficient foundation. 
MR. LARSEN: Yes. I agree. 
Tr, Vol. I, p. 453, L. 25 through p. 454, L. 14.   
However, when Jones was asked nearly identical questions after the jury had returned, he 
attempted to evade and equivocate.   
Q Mr. Jones, do you recognize the signature on Exhibit 40? 
A It doesn’t look like my signature, but if it’s -- I don’t -- and again, I’m not 
positive what document it’s associated with. So it makes it very difficult for me to 
ascertain the validity of it. If it’s the document that I think that it is, I was in a 
very precarious position, if I did, indeed, sign this, I signed it. 
Q I just need a yes or no. 
A With my hand like this, and I was in a very shaky situation, the circumstances 
were very shaky. It was not a normal circumstance like I was coming into your 
office and sitting down. Very extenuating circumstances involved if it’s what I 
think it is. But I don’t know what it is. 
Q Mr. Jones, is that your signature on Exhibit 40? 
A It didn’t look like my signature but could be. 
Q Mr. Jones, I just need a yes or no. Is that your signature? 
A I don’t know what the document is. 
 
Id. at p. 462, L. 1–22. 
                                                 
3 At this point in the trial, the unredacted document had been marked as Exhibit 40.  
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Presumably, Jones’s evasiveness and refusal to answer questions directly stems from a 
belief that his testimony would harm his defense. He chose a similar tactic with regard to Exhibit 
39, refusing to provide a direct answer to questions concerning his signature on the verification 
page of his discovery responses in this case. See Tr Vol I., p. 441, L. 1 through p. 444, L. 19. The 
trial court later noted that Jones had filed with the court those same discovery responses, 
including the verification page, in support of his objection to Safaris Unlimited’s motion for 
summary judgment a few years prior. Specifically, the trial court stated, “If he is denying that 
that is his signature [on Exhibit 39], he is estopped from doing that because, in my view, if that is 
not the truth, that is a fraud on this Court, and I will not tolerate it.” Id. at p. 460, L. 6–9. Jones 
was present on the witness stand when the trial court made this comment.  
Yet mere minutes after this admonition, Jones was effectively denying that his signature 
was on Exhibit 40, contradicting his testimony from moments earlier. Faced with Jones arguably 
perpetrating a fraud on and in front of the court and being charged with protecting and 
maintaining the dignity and integrity of the courtroom, the trial court interceded. “Mr. Jones, the 
question is very simple. Is that or is that not your signature, yes or no?” Id. at p. 462, L. 23–25. 
Again, Jones attempted to evade and equivocate: 
THE WITNESS: It -- 
THE COURT: No, I don’t want an explanation. I want a yes-or-no answer to that 
question. 
THE WITNESS: It’s not the way I sign it, but it might be. 
THE COURT: That is not the question, sir. I want to give you one more 
opportunity to answer the Court’s direct question. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: I’m getting tired of this -- 
THE WITNESS: I suspect -- 
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THE COURT: Be quiet. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Is that or is that not your signature? Yes or no? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
 
Id. at p. 463, L. 1–19. With the appropriate context, it is evident that the trial court was 
attempting to protect the integrity of and maintain order in its courtroom by requiring Jones to 
provide a direct answer to a very simple question. The trial court did not threaten Jones with 
contempt or make any comment on Jones’s credibility. Rather, the trial court merely insisted that 
Jones answer directly the questions posed to him. As it did in Glanzman, this Court should defer 
to the trial court, which was more aware of Jones’s conduct and attitude as a witness during 
cross-examination. 
 Furthermore, any potential perception of bias by the jury was cured by Instruction No. 7. 
See State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 983 P.2d 233 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a potential 
misperception by the jury may be cured by a curative instruction). Instruction No. 7 states,  
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am 
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself 
to be influenced by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, 
nor will I intend to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or are not 
worthy of belief; what facts are or are not established; or what inferences should 
be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seems to indicate an 
opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.  
 
Jones has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion or otherwise 
violated his due process rights under the circumstances. Therefore, his assignment of error with 
regard to the trial court’s questioning of him should not be sustained.   
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C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13 TO THE 
JURY. 
 
Jones contends that the trial court erred in giving Instruction No. 13 to the jury because, 
while it contains a correct statement of the law, the evidence in the record did not support the 
instruction. As with Jones’s argument with respect to the trial court’s comments, this argument 
fails both on its merits and because Jones’s did not preserve the issue for appeal. 
1. By Not Objecting to Instruction No. 13, Jones Has Waived His Right to Claim That the 
Trial Court Erred in Giving Instruction No. 13 to the Jury. 
 
Rule 51 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o party 
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects before 
the jury deliberates, stating distinctly the instruction to which that party objects and the grounds 
of the objection.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 51(i)(3). When a party fails to timely object to a proposed jury 
instruction, he fails to preserve the issue of the propriety of that instruction for appeal. Bates v. 
Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776, 203 P.3d 702, 706 (2009).  
A review of the record reveals that Jones not only failed to object to Instruction No. 13, 
he actually advocated for its inclusion. Tr Vol. I, p. 500, L. 2 through p. 509, L. 15. By way of 
example, during the jury instruction conference with the trial court, Jones’s counsel stated that 
“[w]e need the agency instruction,” that the trial court should “keep it,” and that it includes “a 
correct recitation of the law.”  Id. at p. 503, L. 6; p. 504, L. 16; p. 509, L. 13. As a result, Jones is 
precluded from assigning error on appeal to the trial court giving Instruction No. 13.  
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2. The Evidence at Trial Supported the Inclusion of Instruction No. 13.   
Even if Jones did preserve the issue for appeal, his claim that the trial court erred in 
giving Instruction No. 13 to the jury is without merit. In reviewing whether a jury instruction 
should have been given, this Court asks “whether there is evidence at trial to support the 
instruction, and whether the instruction is a correct statement of the law.” Mackay v. Four Rivers 
Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 (2011). Jones does not dispute that 
Instruction No. 13 correctly states the law as it pertains to agency. Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 
15 (acknowledging that Instruction No. 13 contains “a proper statement of the law”). Rather, his 
contention is that there was no evidence elicited during trial to support the finding that Hingeston 
“was authorized to book hunts on behalf of Safaris.” Id. This position is simply incorrect. 
 During Ms. Ryan’s redirect examination, counsel for Safaris Unlimited asked, “Is 
Graham Hingeston authorized to schedule hunts for Safaris Unlimited?” Tr Vol. I, p. 308, L. 22–
23. Ryan’s response was an unequivocal “Yes.” Id. at L. 24. Based upon this testimony alone, 
there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to give Instruction No. 13 to the jury. Jones’s 
assignment of error is without merit and should be rejected.  
D. BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT COULD NOT DETERMINE THE VALUE OF THE 
SLIGAR LAWSUIT AND THERE WERE NO IRREGULARITIES IN THE SALE 
ITSELF, THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SET THE 
SHERIFF’S SALE ASIDE. 
 
“Whether to set aside an execution sale lies largely within the trial court’s 
discretion.” Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 109, 741 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1986). In determining 
whether the trial court abused its discretion, this Court asks: 
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(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and 
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
 
Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 87, 244 P.3d 224, 231 (2010). 
 
Safaris Unlimited acknowledges that the trial court correctly perceived its decision to set 
aside the sheriff’s sale as discretionary in nature. See Tr Vol. II, p. 39, L. 8–9. However, the trial 
court failed to act consistently with the legal standards applicable to the motion before it. As a 
result, it exceeded the boundaries of its discretion when it found that the purchase price was grossly 
inadequate and found that the fact that the property levied on was “unliquidated litigation” 
constituted the “additional circumstances” necessary to set the sale aside. Furthermore, the trial 
court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. For these reasons, as more fully explained, 
below, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered the sheriff’s sale of the Sligar Lawsuit be 
set aside. 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that the Purchase Price Was Grossly Inadequate. 
 
Nearly ninety years ago, this Court announced, “As a general rule, mere inadequacy of 
consideration is not sufficient ground for setting aside a sheriff’s sale, but it is uniformly held that 
gross inadequacy of consideration, coupled with very slight additional circumstances, is sufficient.” 
Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414, 262 P. 877, 880 (1927). This Court has 
consistently held that there must be both gross inadequacy of consideration and additional 
circumstances that justify setting aside the sale. Neither is sufficient by itself. 
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In prior cases, the Court’s determination of whether consideration is grossly inadequate has 
been made using evidence of the property’s “value.”4 In Curts, for example, the Court used a 
higher, unaccepted bid to determine this amount. Id. In other cases, the Court used extrinsic 
evidence to determine the property’s value. See Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 741 P.2d 1289 
(1986); Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957 (1956). Regardless of the methodology used or 
evidence considered, in every case, the Court first made a finding, either expressly or impliedly, 
regarding the asset’s value before finding that the consideration was grossly inadequate. Indeed, it 
would be illogical to make the latter finding without first making the former.  
The trial court in this case, however, expressly stated that it did not know what the Sligar 
Lawsuit is “really worth.” Tr Vol. II, p. 44, L. 14. “[W]hat’s the right amount to bid?” the trial court 
asked rhetorically. “Do you bid 10,000, 50,000, 125,000? . . . [T]he whole problem with 
unlitigated claims is you don’t know what they’re really worth[.]” Id. at L. 10–14.  
The Mississippi Supreme Court has addressed this issue and articulated an appropriate rule 
governing the situation. “As with any other personal property, a chose in action’s value—for 
purposes of levy and execution—is determined at a sheriff’s execution sale.” Citizens Nat. Bank v. 
Dixieland Forest Prod., LLC, 935 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (Miss. 2006). This is a reasonable approach, 
given the issues inherent with unliquidated and disputed claims. As the trial court noted, “So what 
do you get when you buy a piece of unresolved litigation? You get an expectancy.” Tr Vol. II, p. 
40, L. 19–20. The trial court acknowledged that that expectancy may be worth absolutely 
                                                 
4 In each of these prior cases, the property sold was real property and, therefore, easily appraisable or otherwise 
valued.   
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nothing. “It may be that Mr. Sliger owes Mr. Jones some money, it may be that Mr. Jones owes 
Mr. Sliger some money, it may be that neither one of them owes anybody money. Who knows?” 
Id. at p. 38, L. 25–p. 39, L. 3.   
Because of this uncertainty and the expense of litigation, the market for causes of action 
is understandably smaller than the market for real property. In this case, Safaris Unlimited was 
the only bidder present at the sheriff’s sale. If the only bidder at the sale bid $2,500 for the Sligar 
Lawsuit, then that fact alone should be conclusive evidence of the Sligar Lawsuit’s value. This 
Court should, therefore, adopt the rule pronounced in Dixieland Forest and hold that for purposes 
of levy and execution, a cause of action’s value is determined at a sheriff’s execution sale. If the 
Court adopts that rule, the amount of the bid will be equal to the value of the Sligar Lawsuit, and 
there is no gross inadequacy of consideration.  
Regardless, if the trial court was unable to determine the value of the Sligar Lawsuit, then 
it could not possibly determine that the consideration obtained at the sheriff’s sale was grossly 
inadequate. Therefore, the trial court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards 
and did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Consequently, the trial court abused its 
discretion when it entered the Order Granting Motion to Set Aside Sheriff’s Sale, and this Court 
should vacate that order.  
2. A Sheriff’s Execution Sale May Be Set Aside Only If the Trial Court Finds There Was an 
Irregularity in the Sale in Addition to Gross Inadequacy of Consideration. 
 
As noted above, in order to set a sheriff’s execution sale aside, the trial court must not only 
find that the consideration obtained at the sale is grossly inadequate but also that there were 
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additional circumstances surrounding the sale that justified setting the sale aside. Curts, 45 Idaho 
414, 262 P. at 880. While the language used by the Court to refer to these “additional 
circumstances” has changed somewhat over the years, the underlying requirement has not. Each 
time this Court has addressed the issue, the “additional circumstances” have been or were required 
to be an irregularity with the conduct of the sheriff’s sale. 
In Curts, the “additional circumstances” involved the conduct of a foreclosure sale of real 
property. Prior to the scheduled date of the sale, the creditor’s attorney submitted a written bid to the 
sheriff, asking that the sheriff accept the bid as though it was made at the sale itself. The sheriff did 
not reject the bid or otherwise inform counsel prior to the sale that the bid would be disregarded. In 
reliance upon his letter and the sheriff’s silence with regard to the bid, the creditor’s attorney did not 
attend the sale. The only person who did attend the sale was a representative of a junior lien holder, 
whose winning bid was significantly lower than the creditor’s written bid. In addition, the sheriff 
allowed the bidder to direct the order in which subdivisions of the property were sold. This Court 
held that the bidder had no right to direct the order in which the subdivisions were sold and that the 
sheriff erred in disregarding creditor’s counsel’s written bid and selling the property for a lower 
amount. The Curts Court held that these two facts—both irregularities with conduct of the sale—
constituted the requisite “additional circumstances” and set the sale aside. 
In Gaskill, this Court found that there was an “irregularity” in the sheriff’s sale when, as in 
Curts, the sheriff followed the directions of a third party who had no right to direct the order in 
which the parcels of real property would be sold. Gaskill, 77 Idaho at 432, 293 P.2d at 960. The real 
property sold consisted of two parcels, but the parcels were used as a single unit, with the house and 
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garage situated partly on each lot. This Court found that the sale of the property as separate parcels, 
as requested by a junior lien holder, caused confusion among the bidders, which led to the sheriff’s 
refusal to accept the highest bid that was offered at the sale. Following the rule announced in Curts, 
this Court held that these irregularities in the sale were sufficient “additional circumstances” that, 
when coupled with the inadequacy of the consideration, justified the trial court’s decision to set the 
sale aside.  
In both Curts and Gaskill, this Court found that irregularities in the sale itself constituted the 
requisite “very slight additional circumstances.” In Suchan, the term “very slight additional 
circumstances” was not used by this Court at all. Instead, the rule, as restated by the Suchan Court, 
provides that “gross inadequacy of price coupled with irregularities in the sale warrants vacation.” 
Suchan, 113 Idaho at 109, 741 P.2d at 1296 (emphasis added). The fact that the appellant in that 
case misunderstood her legal rights was held not to be an irregularity in the sale. The appellant’s 
objection that the property was sold as separate parcels rather than as a single unit was also not an 
irregularity because, unlike in Curts and Gaskill, the debtor directed the manner and order of sale 
under the authority of Idaho Code § 11-304.  
In addition, the Suchan Court found that various factors explained the purchase price. The 
Court concluded that “[i]n light of these factors relevant to the adequacy of price, and [the 
appellant’s] failure to prove any irregularity in the sale, we cannot say the magistrate court abused 
its discretion in refusing to vacate the execution sale.” Id. at 110, 741 P.2d at 1297 (citing Gaskill, 
77 Idaho at 433, 293 P.2d at 960) (emphasis added).  
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Even when a party is able to prove gross inadequacy of consideration, that fact, standing 
alone, is an insufficient basis to set aside a sheriff’s sale; there must also be an irregularity with the 
sale itself. Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 302 P.3d 349 (2013). “Our decisions have 
uniformly held that there must be some irregularity in the sale or other slight additional 
circumstance.” Id. at 730, 302 P.3d at 355. It is unclear from the Phillips opinion whether this Court 
intended to revive the “slight additional circumstances” standard that was apparently abandoned in 
Suchan. Each of the cases cited in Phillips involved an irregularity with the sale itself or, as in 
Tudor Engineering Co. v. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 709 P.2d 146 (1985), with the circumstances 
surrounding the sale.  
Issued the year prior to Suchan, the Tudor Engineering opinion neither cites Curts or Gaskill 
nor uses the same standard as those cases. This is because the trial court in Tudor Engineering had 
granted an equitable right of redemption to the debtor, rather than set the sale aside. However, the 
Court did note that “the circumstances surrounding the execution sale” justified the equitable relief. 
Tudor Engineering, 109 Idaho at 575–76, 709 P.2d at 148–49. Those circumstances included the 
judgment creditor’s failure to provide the interested parties with actual notice of the sale, failure to 
first execute on the bond that had been posted, and failure to first obtain a charging order.5 
However, the Phillips opinion notes only the failure to provide notice when citing Tudor 
Engineering. 
                                                 
5 The property sold had been purchased by a partnership in which the judgment debtor was a partner. “Under Idaho 
law, the interest of a partner in partnership property is not subject to execution absent a charging order.” Id. (citing 
Idaho Code §§ 53–325(2)(c) and 53–328). 
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Thus, it appears that the Court’s inclusion of the “other slight additional circumstances” 
language in Phillips was not intended to significantly alter the rule stated in Suchun that there must 
be an irregularity in the sale for the sale to be set aside. In fact, in every Idaho appellate case that has 
reviewed an order granting or denying a motion to set aside a sheriff’s execution sale, the Court’s 
decision has turned on its finding that there was an irregularity with the sale. See Phillips v. Blazier-
Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 302 P.3d 349 (2013); Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 741 P.2d 1289 
(1986); Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957 (1956); Fed. Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, 45 
Idaho 414, 262 P. 877 (1927). When the Court found that there was an irregularity with the sale, the 
sale was set aside. When there was no irregularity, the sale was not set aside.   
3. Because the Trial Court Found that Jones Had Not Shown Any Irregularity in the 
Sheriff’s Sale, It Acted Inconsistently with Applicable Standards When It Ordered that 
the Sale Be Set Aside and that the Sligar Lawsuit Could Not Be Sold. 
 
At the hearing, the trial court stated, “The motion that is before the Court is to set [the 
sheriff’s sale] aside because of the inadequacy of the bid by Safaris. . . . I don’t find that there’s 
any other irregularity shown here.” Tr Vol. II, p. 39, L. 10–13 (emphasis added). The words 
“any other irregularity” indicate that the trial court viewed the amount of the bid itself as an 
irregularity. When asked for clarification concerning this, the trial court stated that the additional 
circumstance justifying its decision to set aside the sale of the Sligar Lawsuit was “the nature of this 
case, that it is an unliquidated litigation.” Id. at p. 44, L. 6–9.  
In essence, the trial court used its inability to determine the value of the Sligar Lawsuit as 
the “additional circumstance” required by Curts and its progeny. Thus, the fact that the Sligar 
Lawsuit is unliquidated became the basis for the trial court’s findings concerning both “gross 
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inadequacy of consideration” and “additional circumstances.” As explained, above, this line of 
reasoning is not supported by any Idaho appellate case addressing the issue. This Court has never 
held that a singular fact can satisfy both elements. Each case has required an irregularity with the 
conduct of the sale. This Court has also rejected the notion that inadequacy of consideration is 
sufficient by itself. Phillips, 154 Idaho at 730, 302 P.3d at 355. 
Furthermore, the trial court’s order effectively renders any unliquidated claim or cause of 
action exempt from execution, which is contrary to Idaho’s statutes addressing execution and 
exemptions. In Idaho, all property is liable to execution unless it is subject to a valid exemption. 
Idaho Code § 11-201. A cause of action is personal property. Kopp v. Baird, 79 Idaho 152, 164, 313 
P.2d 319, 325–26 (1957) (holding that accrued royalties “are a mere chose in action, and therefore 
personal property”); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 710, 201 P.3d 1282, 1287 (2009) (holding that 
“under Idaho law, a chose in action is an asset”). Like other property, a cause of action may be 
transferred to another party and is subject to encumbrances. Idaho Code § 55-402; 63C Am. Jur. 2d 
Property § 22. It is also liable to execution. Idaho Code § 11-201. The trial court acknowledged this 
when it stated that “there’s nothing wrong with having levied upon this litigation.” Tr Vol. II, p. 40, 
L. 1–2. Thus, the Sligar Lawsuit is liable to execution, unless it is subject to a valid claim of 
exemption. 
The general rule is that an asset is exempt from execution only if there is a statute 
specifically providing an exemption. Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 950, 908 P.2d 1252, 1257 
(Ct. App. 1995) (citation omitted). In Idaho, the exemptions available to debtors are set forth in 
Title 11, Chapter 6. There is no exemption available to Jones in those sections or elsewhere—
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and Jones did not file a claim of exemption—relative to the Sligar Lawsuit. See Idaho Code 11-
601 et seq. 
However, the trial court’s order effectively exempted the Sligar Lawsuit from being 
liable to execution. As summarized by the trial court, “[The order] simply means this: That there 
can be no sale of that litigation[.]” Tr Vol. II, p. 41, L. 20–21. “But why not?” the Washington 
Supreme Court asked in a similar case. Johnson v. Dahlquist, 225 P. 817, 818 (Wash. 1924). 
It is property. It is capable of being transferred. It is capable of being converted into 
a judgment which is subject to execution. It is an asset of the judgment debtor, and 
why should not his assets, whatever their nature, be taken to satisfy a judgment? We 
cannot see any logical reason why such property should not be levied on. 
 
Id. 
 
There is no logical reason for the trial court’s order in this case. In fact, the Idaho legislature 
has expressly authorized that a judgment creditor may institute an action against those persons that 
are alleged to owe the judgment debtor money or property. Idaho Code § 11-507. If a judgment 
creditor is expressly authorized to institute and prosecute an action in name of the judgment debtor, 
then there can be no valid basis for denying that same creditor from executing on an action already 
commenced. As one court noted,  
The causes of action in this case may exist only in the mind of the beholder. 
Whether or not they do exist will, of course, depend on the facts (or lack of them) 
adduced at a trial. Nevertheless, these are potential assets and no logical or legal 
reason can be perceived why they should not be marshalled for the benefit of a 
judgment creditor just as any other asset of a judgment debtor. 
 
Whitehead v. Van Leuven, 347 F. Supp. 505, 510 (D. Idaho 1972). 
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The trial court articulated no logical reason why it set aside the sale of the Sligar Lawsuit. 
The trial court found no irregularity in the sale itself and stated that the only “additional 
circumstance” was the fact that the Sligar Lawsuit involves an unliquidated claim. By so doing, 
the trial court acted inconsistently with Idaho law. Accordingly, the order setting aside the sale 
should be vacated.  
E. SAFARIS UNLIMITED IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY’S FEES 
ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE § 12-120(1).  
 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 35(b)(5) and 41, Safaris Unlimited respectfully 
requests an award of its reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal. The trial court awarded attorney’s 
fees to Safaris Unlimited under Idaho Code § 12-120(1), as Safaris Unlimited was the prevailing 
party and the amount pled in Safaris Unlimited’s Complaint was less than $35,000. Jones has not 
challenged that award on appeal, other than asking that it be vacated in the event this Court 
vacates the Judgment. This Court has held that section 12-120(1) can be the basis for an award of 
attorney’s fees incurred on appeal, as well as at the trial level. Loftus v. Snake River Sch. Dist., 
130 Idaho 426, 429, 942 P.2d 550, 553 (1997); see also Cornerstone Builders, Inc. v. 
McReynolds, 136 Idaho 843, 41 P.3d 271 (Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, if Safaris Unlimited 
prevails on its appeal, it is entitled to an award of its attorney’s fees under section 12-120(1). 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth, above, Safaris Unlimited respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the Judgment entered by the trial court and reverse and vacate the trial court’s Order 


